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Abstract
Using a panel of U.S. city-level building permits data, we estimate a Markov-switching model of
housing cycles that allows cities to systematically deviate from the national housing cycle. These
deviations occur for clusters of cities that experience simultaneous housing contractions. We find
that cities do not form housing regions in the traditional geographic sense. Instead, similarities in
factors affecting the demand for housing (such as population growth or availability of credit) appear
to be more important determinants of cyclical co-movements than similarities in factors affecting
the supply for land (such as the availability of developable land or the elasticity of land supply).
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1. Introduction
Recent macroeconomic research has argued that housing market movements are the source
of—rather than the consequence of—business cycle fluctuations.1 For example, housing was the
key instigating component of the recent financial crisis (see Bernanke, 2008) and Leamer (2007)
argues that, at a national level, housing is the business cycle.2 While business cycles are typically
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1Housing wealth effects lead to a correlation between housing and consumption expenditures and are typically
accompanied by changes in housing investment in the same direction. For example, Davis and Heathcote (2005) find
that residential fixed investment leads non-housing investment and is more than twice as volatile.
2These empirical regularities have prompted macroeconomic researchers to consider the theoretical underpinnings
of housing and the business cycle in general equilibrium models (see Iacoviello, 2005; Iacoviello and Neri, 2010).
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measured at a national level, housing markets are generally believed to be highly localized.3 At
the subnational level, the relationship between housing and the business cycle is less clear. Indeed,
Ghent and Owyang (2010) find that, while housing cycles exist at disaggregate levels, the rela-
tionship between business cycles and housing appears to break down at subnational levels.4 The
disconnect generated between the two levels of granularity can present problems for macroeconomic
analysis and policy making.5
What produces the disconnect between housing and business cycles at different levels of dis-
aggregation? One hypothesis is that a national cycle exists across all housing markets, but this
more pervasive cycle is lost in the heterogeneity once the data is disaggregated. In other words,
housing cycles may have both a national and regional element (Del Negro and Otrok, 2007). Local
deviations from the national cycle can be small timing differentials (i.e., cities are just out-of-sync
enough that the average cycle does not match the national cycle) or major departures. In the
former case, a pervasive national cycle could be detected once we account for the deviations. If the
latter case, city-level cycles could be viewed as completely independent of the national cycle.
While much of the recent work has focused on house price dynamics, we are interested in
housing as it relates to the business cycle rather than house price dynamics alone. Saiz (2010)
argues that housing volumes may be a better indicator of business cycle dynamics than house
prices. Indeed, comparing the data on housing permits and prices reveals important differences
in how the two series are connected to the business cycle. Price growth slows during many of the
previous downturns but only becomes negative during the 2007-2009 recession. Permits, on the
other hand, exhibit clear negative growth rates in all NBER recessions, and therefore represent a
more reliable indicator of business cycles. Thus, in this paper, we consider city-level construction
permits to analyze housing cycles at the regional level.6
We adapt the model from Hamilton and Owyang (2012) (henceforth HO), who identify national
and regional business cycle phases. The approach in HO is to allow the data to group states into
regions that have the same business cycles. In our model, during the national phases, all of the cities
will be in expansion or contraction, respectively. Furthermore, cities in the same region (or cluster)
experience simultaneous idiosyncratic contractions, which could lead, lag, or occur separately from
national contractions.
An advantage of the HO model is that it determines the key factors in the grouping of cities—
i.e., it generates endogenous clusters or regions. Cities may cluster for economic (e.g., similar
industrial composition), geographic (e.g., inability to increase the housing stock due to geographic
constraints), or other inherent reasons (e.g., weather). We consider nine covariates in determining
our clusters: housing density, population growth, the share of manufacturing employment, average
3A few papers have modeled subnational business cycles (e.g., Carlino and Sill (2001) for regions, Owyang et al.
(2005) for states, and Owyang et al. (2008) for cities).
4Several papers study housing at the subnational level with mixed results. Glaeser et al. (2011); Del Negro and
Otrok (2007) show that the variation in house prices is primarily driven subnational factors rather than national
factors, while Moench and Ng (2011) find that national shocks have larger effects on the housing cycle than regional
shocks. Stock and Watson (2010) show that although building permits co-move across states, housing market can be
uncorrelated across regions. Other studies find that housing markets have become more integrated in the last decade
(see Cotter et al., 2012; Kallberg et al., 2014; Landier et al., 2013).
5Ghent and Owyang (2010) implies that models need to account for regional differences in U.S. housing cycles,
as regional differences may influence optimal policy conduct. Identifying regions with similar housing characteristics
would help policymakers more accurately predict cross-regional effects, and identify regions to target with particular
policies.
6Alternative results using housing prices yield qualitatively similar conclusions. These results are available upon
request.
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winter temperature, the average unemployment rate, Saiz’s (2010) index of undevelopable land
and elasticity of land supply, as well as two financial variables reflecting the incidence of subprime
mortgages across cities.
We find evidence of a national housing cycle that appears to be linked to the national business
cycle. We also find 3 clusters of cities that experience their own idiosyncratic contractions. These
contractions can occur before and lead into a national downturn, continue after a national downturn,
or occur completely independently of a national downturn. In addition, our method allows us to
determine some of the factors that affect cluster composition. These factors appear to be proxies of
city-level housing demand characteristics rather than housing supply characteristics, factors that
influence business cycle, or factors related to the similarity of financial conditions.7
Our finding that housing cycles may depend on local factors in addition to national factors has
implications for policy implementation, as monetary policy may be transmitted in different ways
throughout the set of clusters. In fact, Fu¨ss et al. (2012) find that specific demand and supply
characteristics at the level of a Metropolitan Statistical Area (henceforth MSA), such as population
growth and the elasticity of housing supply, are crucial links that transmit national monetary policy
and sentiment into housing price inflation at the local level. Therefore, identifying regional clusters
of housing cycles represents relevant information for the optimal conduct of monetary policy. We
also find a cluster in which financial variables are more important, which suggests that regional
differences may influence the conduct of macroprudential policies as well. Our results open up a
new line of research to explore whether fiscal policy or macroprudential policies should consider
regional differences in attempting to balance out housing cycles across regions and evaluating the
heterogeneity in the monetary transmission mechanism.
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows: Section 2 describes the data construction. Section
3 describes the model. Section 4 provides a brief overview of the estimation of the model. Section
5 presents the results and discusses the implications for the determination of the national cycle.
Section 6 offers some conclusions.
2. The Data
In the next subsections, we describe the collection and transformation of the data used to
construct housing cycles and city-level covariates used to form the clusters.
2.1. City-level Building Permits
While city-level building permit data are available for various time periods for the majority
of cities, MSA definitions have changed a number of times over the years. These definitional
changes can present a problem for business cycle analysis, which requires longer time series to
detect switching between phases. Using current MSA-level data for our analysis would limit the
number of cities with available data and the length of the time series which only go back to the
mid-1990s. Therefore, we construct MSA-level permits by aggregating county-level permit data
using the counties included in the December 2009 MSA definitions.8
7Traditionally, the main driver of house price co-movement is geography. Pollakowsky and Ray (1997); Can
(1990); Ioannides and Zabel (2003) find positive feedback effects on house prices between contiguous regions and
within neighborhoods. Stevenson (2004); Oikarinen (2006) show that co-movements or regional housing markets are
driven by substitution effects, where changes in one region’s prices generate a time-lag movement in another region’s
prices. Brady (2011); Holly et al. (2011) also explore the spatial and temporal diffusion of house price shocks in a
dynamic system.
8December 2009 MSA definitions are available from the Census Bureau website http://www.census.gov/
population/metro/files/lists/2009/List4.txt.
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County-level building permits are released monthly as year-to-date levels that accumulate the
monthly changes. Although differencing would yield a monthly flow of permits, the year-to-date
data are constantly revised, confounding identification of an actual change versus a revision. In
addition, the noise in the monthly data affects our filter’s ability to detect switches in cycle phase.
To mitigate these two problems, we use the band-pass-filtered, year-over-year growth rate of the
(final release) monthly building permits series. This transformation also has the benefit of smooth-
ing outliers that would not be considered business cycle phase changes but could be misidentified
by our estimation algorithm.
Our sample consists of data from 1989:01 to 2012:11. We select 135 cities with population
greater than 250,000 residents (based on 1990 populations computed with the 2009 MSA definition)
for which all covariates and permits data are available. We limit our sample size to large cities
because the data for the small cities are inherently noisier, and clustering in larger panels is more
computationally-intensive and more likely to be imprecisely estimated.
Figure 1 depicts the building permits growth series for a few of the cities in our sample.9
The national data are included for comparison; shaded areas represent NBER recession dates.
The national data have a clear cyclical pattern that is roughly coincident with the timing of the
NBER contractions. The U.S. permits data experience some fluctuations apart from the business
cycle dates but the largest downturns begin just before an NBER-defined peak.10 City-level expe-
riences vary widely: Chicago, for example, behaves very similarly to the nation, while Los Angeles
has the same broad features as the nation but has more small, non-national housing contractions.
Reno-Sparks NV experiences even more small, non-national housing contractions than LA, such
that the series almost appears to exhibit seasonality. Table 1 contains the full list of cities in our
sample and summary statistics of the permits growth series. The table provides the Core Based
Statistical Area (CBSA) code, the metropolitan area name, and the mean and standard deviation
of the growth rates in permits.
9The growth rates illustrated in Figure 1 as well as the summary statistics reported in Table 1 refer to the rates
of growth in the monthly permit series after the application of the band-pass filter. The application of the band-pass
filter does not necessarily smooth the growth rates but reduces outliers in the growth series when there are jumps in
the level series.
10As evidenced by the 2001 recession, permit growth does not always fall with the business cycle. Of course, we
have only three national recession experiences in our sample so the results should be extrapolated with caution.
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Figure 1: Building Permits. A Few Cities and the Nation
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Table 1: List of Cities and Permits Growth Rate Statistics
Permits Growth Rate (%)
CBSA MSA Mean SD
10420 Akron, OH -3.5 35.0
10580 Albany-Schenectady-Troy, NY 1.7 45.0
10740 Albuquerque, NM 4.9 42.9
10900 Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ 1.1 36.9
11460 Ann Arbor, MI 0.7 75.6
11700 Asheville, NC 3.6 41.7
12060 Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA 2.4 35.7
12260 Augusta-Richmond County, GA-SC 5.2 40.6
12420 Austin-Round Rock-San Marcos, TX 23.7 67.3
12540 Bakersfield-Delano, CA 3.3 48.0
12580 Baltimore-Towson, MD 0.9 38.4
12940 Baton Rouge, LA 15.2 65.0
13140 Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 27.2 88.9
13820 Birmingham-Hoover, AL 8.4 46.8
14260 Boise City-Nampa, ID 12.8 47.4
14460 Boston-Cambridge-Quincy, MA-NH 2.8 34.5
14860 Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk, CT 7.5 55.7
15180 Brownsville-Harlingen, TX 10.6 42.8
15940 Canton-Massillon, OH 2.5 41.5
15980 Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL 7.0 47.6
16620 Charleston, WV 11.6 66.9
16700 Charleston-North Charleston-Summerville, SC 6.0 39.2
16740 Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill, NC-SC 5.1 39.2
16860 Chattanooga, TN-GA 1.2 31.2
16980 Chicago-Joliet-Naperville, IL-IN-WI -0.4 31.3
17140 Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN -1.9 27.1
17460 Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH -1.4 27.4
17820 Colorado Springs, CO 13.1 52.4
17900 Columbia, SC 6.3 38.8
17980 Columbus, GA-AL 3.9 51.6
18580 Corpus Christi, TX 14.0 62.7
19100 Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington, TX 7.3 31.2
19340 Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL 11.5 58.9
19380 Dayton, OH 5.3 56.0
19660 Deltona-Daytona Beach-Ormond Beach, FL -0.7 40.0
19740 Denver-Aurora-Broomfield, CO 11.6 46.6
19780 Des Moines-West Des Moines, IA 15.7 63.1
19820 Detroit-Warren-Livonia, MI 1.7 38.6
20260 Duluth, MN-WI 8.1 53.3
20500 Durham-Chapel Hill, NC 12.1 60.5
21340 El Paso, TX 12.8 61.0
21500 Erie, PA 17.6 78.8
21660 Eugene-Springfield, OR 12.4 65.0
21780 Evansville, IN-KY 4.7 46.2
22180 Fayetteville, NC 18.3 68.5
23060 Fort Wayne, IN 1.9 37.6
23420 Fresno, CA 4.6 46.3
24340 Grand Rapids-Wyoming, MI 1.6 36.5
24660 Greensboro-High Point, NC 5.5 45.8
continued on next page
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Permits Growth Rate (%)
CBSA MSA Mean SD
24860 Greenville-Mauldin-Easley, SC 5.9 37.8
25420 Harrisburg-Carlisle, PA 2.9 40.8
25540 Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford, CT -0.6 39.4
25860 Hickory-Lenoir-Morganton, NC -0.5 38.3
26420 Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown, TX 12.6 36.9
26620 Huntsville, AL 6.7 52.4
26900 Indianapolis-Carmel, IN 2.4 31.1
27140 Jackson, MS 7.8 51.9
27260 Jacksonville, FL 5.1 42.1
28020 Kalamazoo-Portage, MI 9.3 62.0
28140 Kansas City, MO-KS 6.0 50.8
28660 Killeen-Temple-Fort Hood, TX 26.8 99.9
28700 Kingsport-Bristol-Bristol, TN-VA 4.4 41.7
28940 Knoxville, TN -26.8 276.0
29460 Lakeland-Winter Haven, FL 7.5 51.7
29540 Lancaster, PA 4.6 48.8
29620 Lansing-East Lansing, MI 3.1 53.8
29820 Las Vegas-Paradise, NV 4.1 45.9
30460 Lexington-Fayette, KY 6.7 47.4
30780 Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, AR 13.3 56.2
31140 Louisville/Jefferson County, KY-IN 4.7 39.0
31540 Madison, WI 6.0 44.1
31700 Manchester-Nashua, NH 0.1 44.5
32580 McAllen-Edinburg-Mission, TX 11.7 43.9
32820 Memphis, TN-MS-AR 7.8 55.0
33100 Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL 1.1 40.5
33340 Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI -1.2 35.7
33460 Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 2.2 36.3
33660 Mobile, AL 15.4 65.6
33700 Modesto, CA 1.5 60.7
33860 Montgomery, AL 7.5 65.0
34980 Nashville-Davidson–Murfreesboro–Franklin, TN 6.7 42.6
35300 New Haven-Milford, CT -1.9 44.6
35380 New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA 22.1 97.4
35620 New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island, NY-NJ-PA 3.4 33.2
35980 Norwich-New London, CT 0.3 49.1
36260 Ogden-Clearfield, UT 6.5 37.1
36420 Oklahoma City, OK 9.9 42.2
36540 Omaha-Council Bluffs, NE-IA 7.5 43.7
36740 Orlando-Kissimmee-Sanford, FL 5.4 43.6
37100 Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA 7.5 69.6
37340 Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL 0.0 39.4
37860 Pensacola-Ferry Pass-Brent, FL 6.7 49.8
37900 Peoria, IL 9.6 58.2
37980 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD -1.1 28.3
38060 Phoenix-Mesa-Glendale, AZ 4.8 37.4
38300 Pittsburgh, PA 1.2 28.9
38860 Portland-South Portland-Biddeford, ME 1.0 34.6
38940 Port St. Lucie, FL 1.1 52.4
39300 Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA -4.5 29.1
39340 Provo-Orem, UT 17.9 53.4
39740 Reading, PA 1.2 50.4
39900 Reno-Sparks, NV 11.1 66.0
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7
continued from previous page
Permits Growth Rate (%)
CBSA MSA Mean SD
40060 Richmond, VA -0.4 33.7
40140 Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA -1.3 37.6
40380 Rochester, NY -2.3 35.5
40420 Rockford, IL 1.5 49.3
41180 St. Louis, MO-IL -0.6 27.7
41420 Salem, OR 10.2 71.2
41500 Salinas, CA 13.2 90.5
41700 San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX 12.9 46.9
41740 San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos, CA 7.2 59.2
41860 San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont, CA 7.3 50.9
41940 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 39.2 156.2
42220 Santa Rosa-Petaluma, CA 3.9 63.5
42340 Savannah, GA 8.3 51.9
42540 Scranton–Wilkes-Barre, PA 0.9 43.1
42660 Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue, WA 3.9 36.7
43780 South Bend-Mishawaka, IN-MI 6.8 63.4
44060 Spokane, WA 13.2 71.1
44140 Springfield, MA -3.3 37.8
44180 Springfield, MO 7.9 47.8
44700 Stockton, CA 2.8 48.1
45060 Syracuse, NY 4.5 55.5
45300 Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater, FL 4.8 42.1
45780 Toledo, OH 4.1 52.5
46060 Tucson, AZ 8.2 53.3
46140 Tulsa, OK 8.8 41.5
46700 Vallejo-Fairfield, CA 18.3 93.1
47260 Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News, VA-NC -4.1 55.3
47300 Visalia-Porterville, CA 1.9 38.2
47900 Washington-Arlington-Alexandria, DC-VA-MD-WV 2.9 34.9
48620 Wichita, KS 3.7 41.3
49340 Worcester, MA 3.4 44.9
49620 York-Hanover, PA -0.1 39.7
49660 Youngstown-Warren-Boardman, OH-PA 0.2 42.3
2.2. Covariate Data
In addition to the panel of permits data, we require a set of time-invariant covariates to pa-
rameterize the prior distribution that defines the clusters. Our choice of covariates is meant to
represent factors that affect housing cycles: demand, supply, geography, economic, and financing
conditions. Meen (1999) suggest that co-movements may be caused by factors that affect the de-
mand or the supply of housing. In particular, Meen (1999) finds that co-movements are mainly
caused by migration, equity transfers, spatial arbitrage, and local economic development.
One limitation of the algorithm described below is that the covariate data used to populate the
prior must be time invariant as the model assumes time-invariant clusters. Thus, the cross-sectional
covariates are all computed either as long-run averages or by taking a snapshot at some point in
the sample.
We selected a small set of covariates and calculated long run averages, values at beginning of
our sample, or averages during the sample period, depending on data availability and relevance for
our analysis. For example, we obtained long run historical averages of winter temperatures. We
also calculated housing density and the share of manufacturing employment as of 1990. Population
growth represents the historical annual average in the two decades prior to the beginning of our
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sample.11 To capture economic conditions during the period of analysis, we computed the average
unemployment rate from 1988 to 2012.12 Similarly, we calculated financial variables representing
the increase in availability of credit for the period of subprime credit expansion, from 2002 to 2005.
Finally, we obtained variables representing housing supply conditions from Saiz (2010). Table 2
presents summary statistics of the cross-section of these covariates.
Average population growth over the period 1970 to 1990 proxies the average change in housing
demand, as higher average population growth suggests a higher average demand for new housing. In
addition, the city-level average unemployment rate represents long-run differences in local economic
conditions that may also affect the demand for housing.13 Average winter temperature may be
another proxy for housing demand, especially for a higher income demographic. Housing density is
a proxy for the supply of housing, and Saiz’s (2010) index of undevelopable land reflects geographic
constraints on the elasticity in the supply of housing.14 We include the share of manufacturing
employment because prior studies have shown that it is a determinant of business cycle similarity
and may also influence housing cycle similarity. Finally, the two measures of credit availability are
the change in the proportion of subprime mortgage loans relative to total mortgage loan volume
and the growth in the loan volume of subprime mortgages over the period 2002 to 2005.
3. The Empirical Model
The model is a first-order Markov-switching model in the mean growth rate of each city’s
building permits series. We allow for two regimes at the city level: an expansion regime with
higher average growth rate and a contraction regime with lower average growth rate. In the most
general framework, each city building permit series could have an independent, unobserved 2-state
Markov-switching process. In the most degenerate case, each city would have the same business
cycle, a national cycle. Each of these models yields a regime process that can be summarized in
a single national Markov state variable. In the former case, the Markov variable has 2N possible
regimes; in the latter case, the aggregate variable is a 2-state variable.
We are interested in an intermediate model which simultaneously limits the possible regimes to
a tractable number, estimates a national regime, and allows some heterogeneity across cities. This
11The average population growth is taken from the Census and represents the percent increase in the population
of the counties in the 2009 definition of the MSA between 1970 and 1990. The share of manufacturing employment
is computed from Census county-level data from County Business Patterns. Average winter temperature represents
long-run typical temperatures obtained for each city. The unemployment rates were computed aggregating the
number of the unemployed and the labor force at the county level with data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and
subsequently averaging over the period 1988:1–2012:12. Housing density is total housing units in 1990 divided by
the land area of the MSA. Loan volumes are aggregated from ZIP code level data on loan volumes from the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York Equifax Consumer Credit Panel Data. Subprime loans are defined as those granted to
individuals with an Equifax Risk Score of 660 or less. (This score is a internal generic risk score that ranges between
280 and 850.) Saiz’s (2010) index of undevelopable land represents the proportion of area in each city that cannot
be developed because of geographic constraints.
12Taking averages of the unemployment rate captures persistent differences in economic conditions across cities at
the cost of ignoring trends during the period of analysis.
13Clayton et al. (2010) find evidence that housing demand, in particular, is the main determinant of housing cycles.
They find that both house prices and trading volumes are significantly affected by changes in the labor market, which
include changes in total non-agricultural employment, average household income, and the unemployment rate.
14Expansion of the population away from central urban areas into rural and remote areas (i.e., urban sprawl) is
another factor identified in the literature as affecting house price co-movement. Rising incomes, growing population,
and low commuting costs boost demand for space in distant locations where land is relatively cheap, causing urban
expansion. See, for instance Brueckner (2000), Couch and Karecha (2006), and O’Sullivan (2009).
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Table 2: Summary Statistics of Covariates
Covariate Mean SD Median Min Max
Housing units per sq. km. 1990 56.5 53.2 39.7 4.1 380.7
Avg. population growth (%) 1970–1990 1.5 1.3 1.2 -0.6 6.0
Manufacturing employment share (%) 1990 21.3 8.5 20.0 3.2 58.5
Average winter temperature (◦ Celsius) 4.3 6.9 3.1 -9.6 19.6
Average unemployment rate (%) 1988–2012 6.0 1.8 5.6 3.3 14.2
Saiz’s (2010) index of undevelopable land (%) 27.1 21.0 21.9 0.9 79.6
Saiz’s (2010) elasticity of land supply 2.1 1.0 1.8 0.7 5.5
Change in share of subprime mortgages 2002-2005 -1.5 8.3 -1.9 -36.8 44.1
Growth in subprime mortgages 2002-2005 11.5 12.0 11.6 -20.3 50.4
Notes:
MSA population, housing units, and land area were aggregated from county-level data from the Census Bureau to match 2009 MSA
definitions available at http://www.census.gov/population/metro/files/lists/2009/List4.txt (Retrieved on 11 April 2013).
The manufacturing employment share was computed as the ratio of MSA manufacturing employment to total employment, aggregating
county-level data from the 1990 County Business Patterns from the Census Bureau.
Average winter temperatures represent long-run typical temperatures obtained for each city from the Department of Energy.
Unemployment rates were computed aggregating the number of the unemployed and the labor force at the county level with data from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and subsequently were averaged over the period 1988:1–2012:12.
Saiz’s (2010) index represents the percent of area in each city that cannot be developed because of geographic constraints, and was
graciously provided by the author.
The change in the proportion of subprime mortgage loans and the growth in mortgage loan balances were obtained from credit bureau
data at the zip code level aggregated at the metropolitan area.
framework can be obtained by assuming that a national regime—subject to some restrictions—
exists, but that departures from this national regime (i.e., idiosyncratic contractions) must be
relatively pervasive (i.e., experienced by a group of cities). Thus, our model has both national
cycles and periods during which groups of cities experience contractions by themselves. Let κ
represent the number of groups of cities; the aggregate Markov variable has K = κ + 2 regimes
(one for each idiosyncratic contraction, the national expansion, and the national contraction).15
3.1. Clustered Markov-switching
Formally, let yt denote an (N × 1) vector of observed city-level building permit growth rates
at date t and Yt = (y
′
t,y
′
t−1, ...,y
′
1)
′. Denote St as an (N × 1) vector of contraction indicators (so
Snt = 1 when city n is in contraction and Snt = 0 when city n is in expansion). Suppose that
yt = µ0 + µ1  St + εt, (1)
where the nth element of the (N ×1) vector µ0 +µ1 is the average building permit growth in city n
during contraction, the nth element of the (N×1) vector µ0 is the average building permit growth in
city n during expansion, and  is the Hadamard (element-by-element) product. For identification,
we assume that µ0n > 0 and µ1n < 0; that is, contractions are defined as strictly lower mean growth
rates than expansions. Let E(εtε
′
t) = Σ, and we assume that the covariance matrix is diagonal with
representative element σ2n. The diagonality restriction is made for parsimony and implies that the
correlation across cities is driven primarily through simultaneity in their cycles.
We can summarize the individual Snt with a scalar aggregate regime indicator Zt that represents
15The model is taken from Hamilton and Owyang (2012) and is also similar to Kaufmann (2010). These papers use
clustering algorithms similar to Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter and Kaufmann (2008) to reduce the dimension of the aggregate
Markov-switching process. Other papers with multivariate Markov-switching models include Paap et al. (2009) and
Leiva-Leon (2012).
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the time-t aggregate regime. Let H denote an (N×K) matrix whose elements are all zeros and ones
and where K is the allowed number of possible aggregate permutations (regimes), including both
idiosyncratic contractions and national expansion and contraction. The row n, column k element
of H is 1 if city n is in a contraction when the aggregate regime is k. In a model in which all cities
enter and exit contractions at the same time, K = 2, with the first column being all zeros and
the second column is all ones. As an example, suppose that K = 3; this indicates three regimes:
national-level expansion, national-level contraction, and one idiosyncratic contraction.
For exposition purposes only, consider the example of a cluster consisting of cities with manu-
facturing sectors larger than some predefined threshold. For k = 1, all cities are in expansion, by
definition. For k = 2, all cities are in contraction, by definition. For k = 3, only the cities with
manufacturing sectors above a certain threshold are in contraction; all other cities are in expan-
sion. For purposes of this discussion, we refer to the regimes in which all cities move together as
national regimes and refer to regimes in which some cities are in contraction but others are not as
idiosyncratic contractions.16
The aggregate regime follows a polychotomous K-state Markov process with (K ×K) transition
kernel P. In principle, we could model a world in which Zt is allowed to transition to and from
any aggregate regime. HO impose additional restrictions for identifying the clusters. They assume
that the aggregate regime is free to transition to and from national-level expansions or contractions
at any time. That is, if we label the first two regimes as national-level expansions or contractions,
the first two rows and columns of P are unrestricted. However, HO impose the restriction that
the aggregate regime cannot transition from one idiosyncratic cluster contraction to another. That
is, if K = 4 and Zt−1 = 4, Zt can take on only values of 1, 2, or 4. This aspect presents as zero
restrictions on the transition kernel P and is described in more detail in the estimation section
below.
The model can alternatively be depicted as a mixture of distributions for the mean growth
rate of permits. The distribution of the growth rate of permits conditional on being in (aggregate)
regime k is
yt|zt = k ∼ N(mk,Σ),
where
mk = µ0 + µ1  hk
for hk, the kth column of H.
17
It is important to note here that our setup allows cities to belong to only one cluster at each
iteration of the sampler. At the end of the estimation, however, the results for each city will yield a
posterior probability of belonging to each cluster. We then impose membership into a single cluster
by setting a threshold for the posterior probabilities and assign each city to the unique cluster
where the probability exceeds the threshold. The advantage of imposing membership in only one
cluster is that these clusters can be interpreted as proper “regions”. In our framework, the regions
are not necessarily geographic but depend on the cyclical similarity of the member cities.
One might wonder what the advantage of using the clustered panel approach is compared with
estimating each city separately. In the univariate Markov switching model, the posterior regime
16We do not refer to idiosyncratic expansions as these are simply idiosyncratic recessions for the complement set
of states.
17Note that this specification imposes that the mean rate of growth during a contraction for each city is the same
regardless of whether the cities fall into a national or idiosyncratic contraction. The model could be extended to
allow for regime-specific growth rates, as in Eo and Kim (2016) or to differentiate between national contraction and
idiosyncratic contraction growth rates.
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probability tends to identify a contraction whenever the growth rate begins to turn negative.
Thus, the model can pick up very short-lived, city-specific negative growth periods. When the
data are noisy, the univariate filter may identify a large number of turning-points as a city can
be in contraction at any time, independent of the other cities. In the panel, contractions are only
identified when a number of cities move together. Thus, our cluster recessions will tend to be more
persistent than those identified by a collection of univariate Markov switching models. This feature
is not imposed as a restriction, per se, but is a product of the multivariate filter.
3.2. Logistic Clustering
One of the main features of the model is that it can be used to explain why cities’ housing
cycle experiences are correlated. To do this, we can model the cluster indicators hnk as functions
of a vector of fixed city-level covariates xnk that influences whether city n is in a contraction
when Zt = k. Following Fru¨hwirth-Schnatter and Kaufmann (2008) and HO, we assume that the
probability that a city is in cluster k is defined by:
p(hnk = 1) =

1
1+
∑κ
k=2 exp(x
′
nkβk)
for k = 1
exp
(
x
′
nkβk
)
1+
∑κ
k=2 exp(x
′
nkβk)
otherwise
(2)
for n = 1, ..., N ; k = 1, ..., κ. Note that (2) resembles the probability that we would obtain from a
multinomial logistic regression model.
For implementation, we consider p(hnk) as the prior probability that city n belongs to cluster
k conditional only on the observed covariates. The business cycle data in conjunction with the
prior probability will determine the posterior probability through an application of Bayes’ rule. As
explained in HO, we can take the βs as population parameters even though p(hnk) represents a
form of the prior probability. We can estimate the βs as we would other model parameters and
they will determine which and to what extent the covariates are important for clustering.
4. Estimation
The model presented above is straightforward to estimate in a Bayesian environment. Given a
prior, the joint posterior of the model parameters including the regimes can be generated by the
Gibbs sampler (see Gelfand and Smith, 1990; Casella and George, 1992; Carter and Kohn, 1994).
The Gibbs sampler iterates over draws from each parameter’s conditional posterior distribution.
After discarding a number of initial draws to achieve convergence, the remaining draws form the
full joint posterior distribution of all of the model parameters.
Let Θ represent the full set of parameters. Then, Θ includes the regime growth rates, µ0 and
µ1; the covariance matrix, Σ; the transition probabilities, P; the time series of aggregate regimes,
ZT; the matrix defining the clusters H; and the logistic parameters, β, ψ, and ξ. The number
of clusters, κ, is assumed to be fixed to estimate the other model parameters and is discussed
further below. For now, we will assume that the number of clusters κ is determined exogenously
and is suppressed in the notation. There are four blocks of parameters to be sampled: each city’s
parameter set, θn =
(
µ0n, µ1n, σ
2
n
)
; the aggregate business cycle, ZT, and its associated transition
matrix, P; the matrix H determining the cluster membership; and the logistic parameters, β, ψ,
and ξ.
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Table 3: Priors for Estimation
Parameter Prior Distribution Hyperparameters
[µ0n, µ1n]
′ N
(
m, σ2M
)
m = [2,−1]′ ; M = I2 ∀n
σ−2n Γ
(
ν
2 ,
δ
2
)
ν = 2 ; δ = 2 ∀n
P D (α) αi = 0 ∀i
βk N (b,B) b = 0p ; B =
1
2Ip ∀k
Notes:
The table shows the prior distributions and their hyperparameters for all
model parameters.
D(·) is the Dirichlet distribution.
4.1. Priors
The Bayesian environment requires a set of prior distributions for the model parameters. The
distributional assumptions for the priors will, in turn, yield distributional assumptions on the
posteriors. The city cycle parameters θn are assumed to have a normal-inverse Gamma prior
distribution. The transition probabilities for the aggregate regime process are assumed to have
a Dirichlet prior distribution given the fixed number of regimes. The cluster indicators have the
logistic prior discussed above with population parameters β that are normal. Prior hyperparameters
are shown in Table 3.
4.2. Posterior Inference
As we noted above, the Gibbs sampler consists of iterative draws from the conditional distribu-
tions of the model parameters. In this subsection, we describe the draws; details for the sampler’s
posterior distributions can be found in HO.
Conditional on the other model parameters, the set of city-level parameters, θ, are conjugate
normal-inverse Gamma and independent for all n. Thus, for each n, we first draw the µ0n and
µ1n from a normal posterior distribution that depends in part on the regime-dependent conditional
mean. We then draw the σ−2n from a Gamma posterior distribution. These draws can be made
independently because the εnts are assumed to be uncorrelated.
Conditional on the other model parameters, the posterior distribution of ZT can be obtained
from a multi-regime extension of the Hamilton (1989) filter, a discrete-state modification of the
familiar Kalman filter. For the sampler, we compute the posterior regime probabilities for each
time period and draw each Zt recursively, starting with ZT . This draw is described in Kim and
R. Nelson (1999). Once we have obtained the regimes, we can compute the posterior distributions
for probabilities in the transition kernel. These are conjugate Dirichlet distributions (the multi-
ple regime equivalent to the beta distribution) and depend on the observed number of transitions
from one regime to another. Because we are restricting the number of transitions between idiosyn-
cratic contractions to zero, the posterior distribution for these transition probabilities will also be
identically zero.
The cluster indicators can be drawn by an application of Bayes’ rule. We draw the value of the
cluster membership indicator for each city-cluster combination conditional on the memberships of
all of the other cities. The posterior probability is influenced by the logistic prior probability (i.e.,
the covariates and the estimated βs) and the similarities of city n’s housing cycle to the cycles of
the cities in the cluster in question.
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The logistic prior parameters are drawn in three steps. The marginal inclusion coefficient, βnk,
is drawn from a conjugate normal. The logistic prior requires two other parameters: a latent logistic
variable, ξnk, whose sign is determined by the value of hnk and the variance of this variable, λnk.
We follow Holmes and Held (2006) who generate ξnk from a truncated logistic and then generate
λnk conditional on ξnk.
4.3. Choosing the Number of Clusters
The model outlined in Section 3 is defined for a fixed number of clusters, κ. HO use techniques
outlined in Chib (1995) and Chib and Jeliazkov (2001) to compute marginal likelihoods to determine
κ. These methods use resampling techniques to compute the posterior ordinate – a component of
the marginal likelihood – and are accurate when computed with a large number of post-convergence
iterations. While simple to code, the methods of Chib (1995) and Chib and Jeliazkov (2001) use
Monte Carlo integration to compute the posterior ordinate and are computationally intensive when
the model has a large number of parameter blocks. The number of clusters is then chosen as the
model yielding the highest marginal likelihood which must be computed for each possible value of
κ. Because HO considered states, the number of clusters was assumed to be small and only a small
number of marginal likelihoods were required to determine κ.
In the present analysis, we have a large number of cities, which would require a larger number of
marginal likelihood computations. Because the methods used to compute the marginal likelihoods
are time-consuming, we opted instead for computing a modified version of the BIC for each κ for
a number of clusters between 3 and 9. Computing the BIC has been shown to approximate the
marginal likelihood (e.g., Kass and Raftery (1995) and Raftery (1995)) and is faster to compute
because it does not require resampling. The modification attaches a prior to the model dimension,
putting more weight on parsimonious models. We thus compute the average of the BICs computed
at each draw of the Gibbs sampler. We then select the number of clusters that minimizes this
measure, which in our results corresponds to κ = 3 and K = 5.
5. Results
The results of the estimation are comprised of the growth rates and variances of permits for
each city, the regime processes for the nation and the subgroupings, and the cluster compositions.
5.1. Growth Rates
The model posits that the growth rate in city-level permits take on two average values over
the housing cycle. During expansions, the mean growth rate is µ0; during contractions, the mean
growth rate falls to µ0+µ1, since µ1 < 0. Table 4 lists the cities with the largest and smallest average
expansion growth rates; Table 5 lists the cities with the largest and smallest average contraction
growth rates, and Table 6 lists the cities with the largest and smallest variances. Figure 2 maps
the means of µ0, µ0 + µ1, and σ
2 for each of the cities in our sample.18
While there are large differences in the means across cities, there are surprisingly few geographic
patterns. A number of cities in Texas, for example, have high expansion growth rates but also have
large negative contraction growth rates. However, these combinations are not limited to Texas—or
even warm or southern cities. Some cities in upstate New York, for example, experience similarly
large expansion growth rates. Cities that have large expansion rates appear to also have large
contraction rates: the correlation between µ0 and µ0 + µ1 is 24.8 percent.
18Table 1 shows the mean growth rates and the city-level variances for all of the 135 cities in our sample and
includes the mean and sample standard deviation of each city’s raw building permits growth series.
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Perhaps not surprisingly, cities with high growth rates also typically have a higher conditional
variance; the correlation between µ0 and σ
2 is 46.1 percent. Because the model restricts the cycle
processes to achieve parsimony, city-level fluctuations will manifest in the residuals. This result
then suggests that cities with a rapidly growing housing stock are likely to also experience large,
cycle-independent fluctuations.
5.2. National Housing Cycles
One of the main features of the HO model is that it estimates a pervasive national cycle, which
affects—by assumption—all of the cities simultaneously. Because of the restriction that the national
cycle includes all cities, one believing in abundant city-level heterogeneity might imagine that there
would not be much of a national cycle. On the other hand, one believing in pervasive cross-city
linkages might imagine that idiosyncratic cycles would be less common.
Figure 3 plots the posterior probabilities of a national -level housing contraction, Pr [Zt = 2|YT ].
The probabilities reflect the uncertainty around the polychotomous outcomes: a national housing
expansion, a national contraction, or one of the κ cluster contractions. We note a few key features
of the national housing contractions. First, the nation experiences two major housing downturns
that coincide with business cycle downturns. The first housing downturn is around the time of the
1991 NBER recession and the second is around the time of the 2007-2009 NBER recession; the
housing contraction lasts a little longer than the business cycle contraction in both cases. This
timing is not surprising for the 2007-2009 episode, as it was an economic downturn specifically
associated with a decline in the housing market.
Second, national housing contractions are identified with little uncertainty—that is, there are
very few periods for which the regime probability is between zero and one. Third, a few instances
of national housing contractions are not associated with national recessions.
Finally, a long-lasting national housing contraction does not occur during the 2001 NBER
recession in our sample (only short-lived episodes). This divergence in cycles is likely because
there were localized housing downturns during these periods but they were not pervasive enough
to include all of the cities in our sample. Thus, they can be characterized by cluster contractions
instead of national contractions.19
5.3. City-level Housing Cycles
Before we can compare the city-level cycles, we must first determine the number of clusters
preferred by the data. We treat the number of clusters as a model selection problem and compute
a modified Bayesian information criterion (BIC) for various numbers of clusters. Our objective is
to be as parsimonious as possible, so the parameter penalty in the BIC helps reduce the chance
that the model becomes overparameterized.
We choose the model with κ = 3. As our method generates posterior probabilities of belonging
to each cluster, we classify a city falling in a cluster if it has higher than 50 percent posterior
probability in that cluster. If a city belongs to no cluster by this metric, we place it in a separate
group. The clusters so defined are mutually exclusive because the method generates cluster posterior
probabilities that add up to one.
Once we have determined the number of city-level idiosyncratic cycles, we can examine how
the aggregate regime process evolves. Recall that, while we have defined the national cycles as
19Indeed, this period is identified as a national housing contraction in models with a smaller the number of clusters.
However, as we will see below, the data prefer a model with a larger number of idiosyncratic clusters. This finding is
consistent with a large but not full set of cities experiencing a housing downturn in 2001.
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Table 4: Smallest and Largest Permits Growth Rates: Expansion
Cities with smallest µ0
CBSA MSA µ0
25860 Hickory-Lenoir-Morganton, NC 0.040
39300 Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA 0.046
28940 Knoxville, TN 0.057
33340 Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis, WI 0.058
40380 Rochester, NY 0.059
44140 Springfield, MA 0.060
17140 Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN 0.072
17460 Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 0.073
31700 Manchester-Nashua, NH 0.073
10420 Akron, OH 0.076
Cities with largest µ0
CBSA MSA µ0
46700 Vallejo-Fairfield, CA 0.267
14260 Boise City-Nampa, ID 0.267
12940 Baton Rouge, LA 0.270
41700 San Antonio-New Braunfels, TX 0.270
21500 Erie, PA 0.278
17820 Colorado Springs, CO 0.280
13140 Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 0.320
12420 Austin-Round Rock-San Marcos, TX 0.361
28660 Killeen-Temple-Fort Hood, TX 0.381
41940 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 0.470
Notes:
The table shows the cities with the smallest (top panel) and largest
(bottom panel) growth rates in permits during expansion ( µ0 ).
CBSA is the city’s Core Based Statistical Area code.
Growth rates are the average year-over-year changes given in decimal
points (0.01 is one percent).
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Table 5: Smallest and Largest Permits Growth Rates: Contraction
Cities with smallest µ0 + µ1
CBSA MSA µ0 + µ1
38940 Port St. Lucie, FL −0.328
40140 Riverside-San Bernardino-Ontario, CA −0.323
33700 Modesto, CA −0.307
15980 Cape Coral-Fort Myers, FL −0.303
37100 Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura, CA −0.287
37340 Palm Bay-Melbourne-Titusville, FL −0.284
12060 Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta, GA −0.267
35300 New Haven-Milford, CT −0.253
38060 Phoenix-Mesa-Glendale, AZ −0.250
33100 Miami-Fort Lauderdale-Pompano Beach, FL −0.242
Cities with largest µ0 + µ1
CBSA MSA µ0 + µ1
19340 Davenport-Moline-Rock Island, IA-IL −0.024
21340 El Paso, TX −0.013
21500 Erie, PA −0.008
30780 Little Rock-North Little Rock-Conway, AR −0.006
16620 Charleston, WV −0.005
39340 Provo-Orem, UT 0.003
22180 Fayetteville, NC 0.012
33660 Mobile, AL 0.050
35380 New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner, LA 0.105
13140 Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 0.149
Notes:
The table shows the cities with the smallest (top panel) and largest (bottom
panel) growth rates in permits during contraction ( µ0 + µ1 ).
CBSA is the city’s Core Based Statistical Area code.
Growth rates are the average year-over-year changes given in decimal points
(0.01 is one percent).
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Table 6: Smallest and Largest Permits Growth Rate Volatility
Cities with smallest σ2
CBSA MSA σ2
41180 St. Louis, MO-IL 0.084
17140 Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN 0.088
37980 Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington, PA-NJ-DE-MD 0.091
17460 Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor, OH 0.093
38300 Pittsburgh, PA 0.093
39300 Providence-New Bedford-Fall River, RI-MA 0.095
16980 Chicago-Joliet-Naperville, IL-IN-WI 0.099
16860 Chattanooga, TN-GA 0.107
33460 Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, MN-WI 0.108
26900 Indianapolis-Carmel, IN 0.112
Cities with largest σ2
CBSA MSA σ2
16620 Charleston, WV 0.433
22180 Fayetteville, NC 0.444
28660 Killeen-Temple-Fort Hood, TX 0.467
21500 Erie, PA 0.494
44060 Spokane, WA 0.495
46700 Vallejo-Fairfield, CA 0.594
13140 Beaumont-Port Arthur, TX 0.668
41500 Salinas, CA 0.688
41940 San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara, CA 1.100
28940 Knoxville, TN 1.393
Notes:
The table shows the cities with the smallest (top panel) and largest (bottom
panel) residual volatility in permits growth rates ( σ2 ).
CBSA is the city’s Core Based Statistical Area code.
Growth rates are the average year-over-year changes given in decimal points
(0.01 is one percent).
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Figure 2: Model estimates, κ = 3
(a) µ0
(b) µ0 + µ1
(c) σ2
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Figure 3: Posterior Probabilities of a National Level Housing Recession, κ = 3
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Table 7: Transition Probabilities
To Exp To Rec To C1 To C2 To C3
Zt+1 = 1 Zt+1 = 2 Zt+1 = 3 Zt+1 = 4 Zt+1 = 5
From Exp Zt = 1 0.9303 0 0 0.0697 0
From Rec Zt = 2 0 0.8825 0.0331 0 0.0845
From C1 Zt = 3 1 0 0 0 0
From C2 Zt = 4 0 1 0 0 0
From C3 Zt = 5 0.1851 0 0 0 0.8149
Notes:
The table shows the transition probabilities (P) for the aggregate state variable (Zt) for
κ = 3 clusters and K = κ+ 2 = 5 states.
Exp and Rec signify national contractions.
C1 through C3 signify the corresponding cluster contraction.
Bolded zeros represent ex ante identifying restrictions on the probabilities.
the regimes for which all cities are either in or out of housing contractions, that is, national cycles
imply that all cities are either in the high-growth or in the low-growth state simultaneously, there
will still be idiosyncratic contractions for some cities that are realized when the aggregate regime
is Zt = k ≥ 3. During a cluster-k contraction, cities in cluster k will be in the low-growth state
while other cities are in the high-growth state. Recall also that we have imposed the identifying
restriction that disables transitions between these idiosyncratic contractions. Thus, the (aggregate)
economy must pass through either full expansion or full contraction before transitioning into another
idiosyncratic contraction.
Table 7 shows the estimated transition probabilities for the aggregate regime, Zt. Bold zeros
reflect the imposed restriction that Zt cannot transition from one idiosyncratic regime to another. In
addition to the imposed restrictions, we find that a few other transition probabilities are estimated
to be zero. For example, we find no transitions from Zt = 1 to Zt+1 = 2. How can this occur?
The data indicate that transitions from national expansions to national contractions can only occur
through one of the cluster contractions—that is, a group of cities always begins contracting before
it spreads to the entire country.
Figure 4 plots the posterior probabilities of the idiosyncratic clusters, Pr [Zt = k + 2|ΩT ]. We
also plot the probability of the national contraction in each panel for reference. These figures
illustrate that cities in Cluster 2 enter into a contraction ahead of other cities. Following a national
contraction, cities in Cluster 1 come out of the contraction a period later than other cities, and
cities in Cluster 3 take even longer to come out of a contraction. According to the estimated
persistence probability, the latter group stays on average 5 periods, i.e. nearly half a year, longer
in contraction than all other cities.
Figure 5 shows the composition of the different clusters. In these maps, we display the cities
that are members of each particular cluster. As with the growth rates, we find only loose geographic
patterns in the behavior of the city housing cycles.
Cluster 1 contains cities all across the country without an obvious geographical pattern, although
primarily in the Midwest, South, and the West and East coasts. The predominant feature of these
cities’ housing experiences is that they contracted in the early 1990s and late 2000s.
Cluster 2 is composed of cities that have idiosyncratic contractions but has a much smaller
membership. Again, there is no real geographic pattern to membership. Neighboring cities do not
appear to influence each other’s membership to this cluster. The predominant feature of these
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Figure 4: Posterior Probabilities. National Cycle and Idiosyncratic Clusters, κ = 3
(a) Cluster 1 (b) Cluster 2
(c) Cluster 3
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Figure 5: City clusters
cities’ housing experiences is that they entered into contraction ahead of other cites. These results
suggest that national downturns begin in a large number of cities and eventually grow to affect all
cities.
Cites in Cluster 3 do, to some extent, exhibit a more geographical pattern with cities in the
Midwest, the Northeast, and in the South appearing to be more likely to be included. Cities in
this cluster remained in contraction following the national downturns of the mid 1990s. Cities in
Cluster 3, if they stay longer in contraction than the other cities, they stay considerably longer.
According to figure 4 panel (c), the contractions of cities in Cluster 3 lasted twice as long as for
all other cities. Cities in Cluster 3 also remain in contraction after the final national contraction in
our sample, which occurred around 2010.
In general, we conclude that geography and size (population) do not appear to be the only key
determinants of cluster composition. The larger clusters might appear regionally connected but
they are so large as to obscure any real patterns. In the next section, we formally investigate what
factors might determine cluster membership.
5.4. What Factors Affect the co-movements
To help determine the factors that might make city-level housing cycles co-move, we included
a set of city-level covariates in the prior for the clusters.20
These variables are intended to characterize differences and similarities in the supply and de-
mand for housing across cities. Demand elements include population growth (which could reflect
migration in or out of the city), average winter temperature (which may reflect location preference),
and the average unemployment rate (which may proxy for economic conditions affecting household
income). Housing density and the index of undevelopable land are both indicators of housing sup-
20The prior can be thought of as sorting a city into or out of a cluster when the cyclical data (the city’s cycle
compared to the cluster’s cycle) is inconclusive. The effect of the prior, in a sense, is to sort the city into the cluster
if the city has similar characteristics to the other cities in that cluster. The prior is only important if the likelihood
of the being in or being out of the cluster are about equal.
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Table 8: Marginal Effects of the Covariates
Covariate β2 β3
Constant -0.180 -0.223
Housing units per sq. km. 1990 -0.062 -0.042
Avg. population growth (%) 1970–1990 -0.009 -0.192
Manufacturing employment share (%) 1990 -0.050 0.103
Average winter temperature (◦ Celsius) -0.004 -0.027
Average unemployment rate (%) 1988–2012 0.001 0.057
Saiz’s (2010) index of undevelopable land (%) 0.000 -0.003
Saiz’s (2010) elasticity of land supply 0.003 -0.017
Change in share of subprime mortgages 2002-2005 -0.011 0.092
Growth in subprime mortgages 2002-2005 -0.020 0.030
Coefficients other than the constant, c, have been scaled by Λ(c)(1−Λ(c)), where
Λ(x) = (1 + exp(−x))−1 is the logistic cdf . Because the covariates have been
standardized to have mean zero and unit standard deviation, the scaled coefficients
can be interpreted as marginal effects evaluated at the means, and represent the
change in the likelihood of cluster membership in response to a one-standard-
deviation from the mean in the variable of interest.
Coefficients in bold indicate that zero lies outside the interior 95 percent coverage
interval.
In the multinomial logistic, coefficients β1 have been normalized to 0.
ply and indicate how easily new housing can be constructed in the metro area.21 We also include
covariates related to subprime mortgages, as an indicator of local financial conditions and credit
availability and the share of manufacturing employment as proxy for industrial composition in the
city.
Table 8 shows the estimated values of the coefficients in the multinomial logistic prior, where
bold indicates values for which zero is not contained in the 95-percent coverage interval of the
posterior distribution of the βs. Because we estimate a multinomial logistic model, the parameters
of Cluster 1 are normalized to 0 and the coefficients for Clusters 2 and 3 are interpreted relative to
Cluster 1.
We find that housing demand factors play a more important role for determining membership
to Cluster 3 relative to Cluster 1 (as indicated by the importance of population growth).
Saiz’s indicators of land supply do not appear to be crucial factors in synchronizing cities’
housing cycles, supporting the finding that geographic factors are not the main determinants of
clustering. However, housing density seems to decrease the probability of belonging to Cluster 2
relative to Cluster 1.
These results do not suggest that supply factors are not important for housing markets in
general. They may play a role in determining similarities in the trends in housing markets and may
be more important for prices than for permits.22
Financial variables are important covariates for determining membership to Cluster 3. The
21We acknowledge that the categorization of the covariates in terms of housing demand and supply factors is, to
some extent, arbitrary, however we believe it helps organize the discussion.
22In fact, the elasticity of land supply plays an important role in determining the clusters when we use house price
growth as indicators of housing cycles.
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change in the share of subprime mortgages has a positive and significant effect on the probability
of being part of Cluster 3. Membership to Cluster 3, is additionally driven by economic factors.
In particular, membership to Cluster 3 is positively influenced by a higher share of manufacturing
employment.
The importance of economic factors, particularly for Cluster 3, are supported by traditional
location-quotient and shift share analyses that characterize the most important industries in sub-
national regions.23 These traditional approaches show that cities in Cluster 1 are more specialized
in the construction and leisure and hospitality sectors. For cities in Cluster 2, the most important
sector is natural resources and mining. For cities in Cluster 3, manufacturing and education and
health are the most important industries. (The location-quotient and shift share calculations using
employment data for 11 supersectors are available upon request.) The importance of the manu-
facturing sector is illustrated also in Table 9, which presents summary statistics of the covariates
grouped by cluster.
We find that the determinants of housing cycle similarity differ substantially from the determi-
nants of business cycle similarity (as in HO), which supports Ghent and Owyang’s (2010) conclusion
that, at a subnational level, housing cycles and business cycles are not as connected as they appear
to be at the national level. We find that both housing demand- or supply-side factors are important
determinants of similarities in the cyclical fluctuations in housing.
6. Conclusions
Despite the strong linkages often found between housing market cycles and business cycles at the
national level, the relationship between housing and the business cycle is less clear when considering
subnational data because housing markets are highly localized. In this paper, we examine the cross-
city linkages in housing cycles by estimating a cluster Markov-switching model of building permits.
We find that there does exist a national housing cycle which roughly coincides with the national
business cycle as determined by the NBER. In addition, cities experience idiosyncratic housing
contractions either through early entry into national contractions, prolonged exposure to national
contractions, or purely idiosyncratic contractions.
We find that the presence of regional housing cycles may depend on local factors in addition
to national factors. We estimate that idiosyncratic contractions occur in three clusters, for which
membership is influenced by similarities in factors influencing both housing demand and supply or
factors influencing the similarity of business cycles. For the most part, we also find that geography
does not seem to be an important determinant of cluster membership.
Finally, regional differences in housing cycles can have implications for the transmission of mon-
etary policy or for implementing macroprudential policies across regions in the U.S. The possibility
of different reactions to a single national-level policy suggests that models should take heterogeneity
into account and consider, for example, differences in housing demand, the size of the population,
or different strengths of housing shocks across regions when designing policy. In light of our results,
housing demand heterogeneity could be an important consideration when assessing the relative ef-
fectiveness of a policy across multiple regions. While monetary policy is designed to be determined
23The location quotient is defined as the share of industry employment in a region relative to the share of industry
employment in the nation. Shift share analysis decomposes regional industry growth (e.g., in employment) into
national trends, industry trends, and idiosyncratic regional factors. Both approaches are used to identify areas where
a regional economy exhibits competitive advantages or disadvantages when compared with the nation. See, e.g.
Coulson (2010) and Coulson et al. (2013).
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Table 9: Summary Statistics by Cluster
Covariate Cluster Mean SD Median Min Max N
Housing units per sq. km. 1990 1 61.9 60.4 42.1 5.4 380.7 84
2 22.3 13.4 24.2 4.1 46.8 10
3 55.9 37.5 52.6 5.9 165.4 33
No cluster 43.8 43.7 31.0 13.8 148.6 8
Avg. population growth (%) 1970–1990 1 1.8 1.4 1.5 -0.1 6.0 84
2 1.9 0.7 1.9 0.7 2.7 10
3 0.6 0.9 0.4 -0.6 3.8 33
No cluster 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.0 2.3 8
Manufacturing employment share (%) 1990 1 20.2 8.3 19.3 3.2 58.5 84
2 14.4 4.4 15.0 6.9 19.8 10
3 27.1 7.0 27.9 12.6 39.9 33
No cluster 18.1 6.3 16.1 10.9 26.7 8
Average winter temperature (◦ Celsius) 1 5.5 6.5 5.3 -6.7 19.6 84
2 6.3 7.7 8.1 -7.8 15.3 10
3 0.4 6.1 -1.5 -9.6 16.9 33
No cluster 5.1 7.7 6.3 -5.8 13.6 8
Average unemployment rate (%) 1988–2012 1 5.8 1.6 5.5 3.6 12.6 84
2 7.2 3.4 5.6 3.3 13.8 10
3 6.2 1.9 5.7 4.2 14.2 33
No cluster 5.9 0.8 6.0 4.5 7.1 8
Saiz’s (2010) index of undevelopable land (%) 1 29.3 22.8 23.2 1.0 79.6 84
2 31.9 19.1 28.9 5.8 66.1 10
3 20.6 14.3 17.9 0.9 55.3 33
No cluster 25.0 24.8 18.1 2.5 71.7 8
Saiz’s (2010) elasticity of land supply 1 1.9 1.0 1.6 0.7 5.4 84
2 1.8 0.6 1.7 1.1 3.2 10
3 2.4 1.1 2.2 0.9 5.5 33
No cluster 2.6 1.2 2.3 1.0 4.6 8
Change in share of subprime mortgages 2002-2005 1 -1.6 10.5 -2.2 -36.8 44.1 84
2 -3.1 1.6 -3.7 -5.0 -0.9 10
3 -0.8 1.4 -1.0 -3.1 3.1 33
No cluster -1.3 0.9 -1.4 -2.6 0.4 8
Growth in subprime mortgages 2002-2005 1 9.1 11.5 10.0 -20.3 37.0 84
2 9.1 9.9 9.5 -8.1 24.1 10
3 17.8 12.8 14.5 -3.5 50.4 33
No cluster 13.2 8.1 12.4 -1.6 23.0 8
Notes:
MSA population, housing units, and land area were aggregated from county-level data from the Census Bureau to match 2009 MSA
definitions available at http://www.census.gov/population/metro/files/lists/2009/List4.txt (Retrieved on 11 April 2013).
The manufacturing employment share was computed as the ratio of MSA manufacturing employment to total employment, aggregating
county-level data from the 1990 County Business Patterns from the Census Bureau.
Average winter temperatures represent long-run typical temperatures obtained for each city from the Department of Energy.
Unemployment rates were computed aggregating the number of the unemployed and the labor force at the county level with data
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and subsequently were averaged over the period 1988:1–2012:12.
Saiz’s (2010) index represents the percent of area in each city that cannot be developed because of geographic constraints, and was
graciously provided by the author.
The change in the proportion of subprime mortgage loans and the growth in mortgage loan balances were obtained from credit bureau
data at the zip code level aggregated at the metropolitan area.
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at the national level, macroprudential policies or financial regulations could potentially address
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